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Public Private Partnerships (PPP) represent an increasingly 
frequent investment pattern where composite stakeholders 
interact in joint initiatives. Alignment of interests and consequent 
composition of conflicts is driven by the business purpose of the 
shared corporation, represented by a private Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV) within a Project Financing (PF) investment package. 
Corporate governance implications go beyond the traditional 
contraposition between ownership and control, showing 
cooperative patterns where the value is co-created and distributed. 
Big data-driven networks represent a trendy issue that connects 
public and private stakeholders through digital platforms where 
data are shared in real time. Information asymmetries and 
governance concerns are consequently softened.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study addresses to complementary issues:  
1. how PPP initiatives differ from standard 
corporations and  
2. to which extent the information 
asymmetries that they incorporate are affected by 
big data through shared digital networks.  
The major research question concerns the 
interaction of PPP stakeholders, connected through 
digital platforms that convey big data-driven 
information, to generate shared and co-created 
value. PPP stakeholders go beyond the traditional 
principal – agent relationship that shapes classic 
ownership and control issues, since they embody 
public actors interacting with private players and 
their backing financial lenders. In this triangular 
relationship, risk is professionally minimized and 
attributed to the part that can better manage it.  
It will be shown that the targets of this public-
private cooperation go beyond the traditional 
vision of the firm, also because this relationship is 
typically long-termed, with a consequential 
emphasis on economic, social and environmental 
sustainability. 
The innovative aspect of this paper is also 
represented by the consideration of two further 
approaches for the examination of how information 
asymmetries work: digital networks and big data. 
Digital networks represent a bridging platform for 
interacting PPP stakeholders, whereas big data fuel 
in real time with massive information these 
platforms. The impact of big data on the 
informative set is relevant, albeit still largely under 
investigated.  
Information asymmetries have significant 
impact on corporate governance traditional issues, 
since they increase the conflicts of interest among 
diverging stakeholders, tempted by opportunistic 
behaviours as moral hazard or adverse selection. 
The cost of collected capital consequently 
increases, representing a funding issue that in 
capital intensive investments, as long-termed PF, 
may represent a serious drawback; hence the 
importance of mitigation strategies that can find in 
the big data reservoir an unprecedented 
opportunity for more timely and shared 
information. 
All these aspects are not present in the 
current corporate governance debate, especially 
considering the innovative combination of PPP 
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governance issues with big data and networked 
digital platforms. 
Questionable issues also involve the 
ontological explanation of the theory of the firm, 
considering in particular its evolving and less clear-
cut boundaries. The PPP firm, represented by a 
private SPV, is a synthesis of the heterogeneous 
relationships of several private stakeholders that 
share their joint venturing targets. This is a further 
concern that is synthetically examined in the paper, 
again with an innovative perspective. 
Value co-creation is another aspect that will be 
examined, considering the constant interactions 
among PPP stakeholders through digital platforms 
nurtured in real time by big data. Even this 
approach is innovative, since it deals with 
interdisciplinary issues that are not traditionally 
linked to corporate governance issues. Trendy 
issues as governance applications to smart cities or 
fintech projects, driven by artificial intelligence and 
machine learning, will be shortly illustrated in the 
conclusion as a new research frontier. 
Corporate governance implications can be 
extended to other sectors and circumstances, even 
beyond the PPP context, with innovative 
explanatory patterns. 
This paper follows an interdisciplinary 
approach where several different topics, apparently 
unrelated, are examined together. They so need to 
be shortly defined, to better understand their 
meaning and their belonging to a shared area that 
deals with the peculiar corporate governance issues 
analysed in this study. 
PPP is "a long-term contract between a private 
party and a government entity, for providing a 
public asset or service, in which the private party 
bears significant risk and management 
responsibility, and remuneration is linked to 
performance" (PPP Knowledge Lab; 
http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private 
partnership/overview/what-are-public-private-
partnerships).   
PPP investments are often conceived with PF 
schemes. PF is a financial package that backs an 
infrastructural investment with extended duration 
and long and complex gestation process, 
substantially illiquid due to its lumpiness and 
indivisibility, capital intensive, highly leveraged and 
difficult to evaluate - all characteristics that make 
the investment intrinsically risky. When complexity 
grows, risk increases and supervision becomes 
more important (Moro Visconti, 2013a): hence the 
importance of information that can be fuelled by 
big data sharing among PPP stakeholders. Being 
PPP/PF investments typically highly leveraged and 
with a peculiar public-private relationship, they 
raise unusual corporate governance issues. 
In contract theory and economics, information 
asymmetries deal with the study of decisions in 
transactions where one party has more or better 
information than the other. This creates an 
imbalance of power in transactions, which 
sometimes cause the transactions to go awry. 
Examples of this problem are adverse selection, 
moral hazard, and information monopoly 
(examined in par. 2.5). Most commonly, information 
asymmetries are studied in the context of 
principal–agent problems and so influence 
corporate governance concerns and conflicts of 
interest among stakeholders. They represent an 
important governance concern, particularly in long-
termed PF investments; hence the relevance of 
information sharing among composite 
stakeholders.  
Big data is the term for any gathering of large-
volume information sets from multiple sources and 
is so expensive, fast changing, and complex that it 
can become hard to process. The explosive growth 
of data in almost every industry and business area 
is driven by the rapid development of the web, 
Internet of Things (IoT), and cloud computing (Jin 
et al., 2015). It will be shown in par. 3. that big data 
can soften information asymmetries and 
consequent governance concerns. 
The best transmission channel of big data is 
represented by digital platforms and networked 
value chains. Digital platforms are the virtual 
marketplace where products and services are 
exchanged by buyers and sellers, often through 
B2B, B2C or C2C e-commerce transactions, thus 
feeding the high volume of information that will be 
analysed with data mining. 
Value chains, based on traditional databases, 
become networked when they are linked to other 
chains through value-adding networks. Being digital 
platforms networked by web applications, they are 
naturally fit to interpret interactions among 
networking public and private stakeholders. 
Chains are linked by networks, and network 
theory (see Caldarelli, Catanzaro, 2012; Newman, 
2010; Jackson, 2008) is the study of graphs as a 
representation of (a)symmetric relations among 
discrete objects. A network can be defined as a 
graph in which nodes and/or edges have attributes 
(e.g. names). Networks are intrinsically consistent 
with interacting stakeholders, especially in PPP 
agreements. 
The paper is organised as follows: after a 
preliminary analysis in par. 2. of the peculiar 
nature of the private SPV (PPP investment 
company), general corporate governance issues will 
be adapted to the PPP / PF context (par. 2.1.), 
considering also agency problems (par. 2.2.), 
partially deriving from incomplete contracting. 
Control rights of large shareholders and large 
creditors are then examined in par. 2.3., as they 
represent the typical situation of PF investments 
where shareholders are typically concentrated (at 
least in the beginning, since the private SPV is 
normally unlisted) and so are creditors, mainly 
represented by banks (sometimes syndicated) or 
large project bond underwriters. 
Even if SPVs are typically highly leveraged 
(Moro Visconti, 2013b), agency costs of debt are 
different and somewhat milder than in other 
situations, due to the different understanding of 
risk patterns and to the asset composition (being 
intangibles typically under-represented). 
Information asymmetries are also different 
from standard corporate governance cases (Cai et 
al., 2015), and so are adverse selection and moral 
hazard temptations. A compared analysis of 
standard corporate debt finance and the PF model 
(par. 2.5., Table 1) will show the reasons and 
governance implications.  
The impact of big data on information   how 
pervasive and timely data affect the behaviour of 
composite PPP stakeholders. Value co-creation 
(Galvagno, Dalli, 2014) may represent a positive 
outcome of cooperative strategies, when 
shareholders find proper incentives to align their 
naturally divergent interests. 
While Yan et al., 2015, examine the impact of 
big data on information asymmetries in Peer-to-
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Peer lending, to the author’s knowledge, big data 
has not yet been related to PPP, PF and corporate 
governance concerns.  
Further research results and open issues will 
be examined in the conclusion (par. 4). 
 
2. THE PPP INVESTMENT COMPANY AS A 
COASIAN NEXUS OF CONTRACTS 
 
An “ontological” analysis about the reasons behind 
the existence of the PF firm (typically represented 
by an investment company under the form of a 
private SPV) seems useful not only on the 
theoretical side, but also considering insightful 
practical applications, particularly intriguing within 
the PF industry, where different companies – from 
the public buyer, to the SPV, its backing banks and 
other related companies – coexist and interact in a 
complex scenario. 
The private entity activity may well be 
unbundled in different companies, each performing 
a single task (building, management, supply of 
technical services …): considering just one SPV 
makes the model simpler and reduces the 
counterpart risk of the public part, to the extent 
that it has just one interlocutor. Competition 
among different private bidders takes place during 
the tender, but then the game is over and the 
“wedding” between the public and the private part 
is celebrated (De Clerck et al., 2012), with few and 
painful divorce possibilities till the expiration of 
the concession.  
It should not be forgotten that each SPV is 
unique, with its long-term responsibilities and legal 
liabilities. Consequently, even if basic rules and 
best practices of PF are increasingly standardized, 
each investment has its intrinsically risky 
peculiarities. 
The SPV can be considered as a nexus of 
contracts both internally, so justifying in a Coasian 
way its very existence, and externally, should 
agreements with third parties be considered, within 
a broader framework. Within the PF industry, 
external relationships are particularly important, 
since investment companies typically have complex 
multi-task assignments, where the traditional 
“make it or buy?” strategic trade-off becomes even 
more important than elsewhere. 
External nexuses of contracts typically involve 
synergic stakeholders, linked to the SPV with pass-
through contracts or other cooperative agreements.  
The Coasian rationale behind the ontological 
existence of the firm, considered as a nexus of 
contracts, may tentatively be extended to a wider 
framework, where the PF firm (investment company 
– SPV) is analysed within its broader legal “web” 
within a PPP framework that must be convenient 
for all the stakeholders.  
The internal nexus of contracts may so be 
expanded to consider also external legal 
agreements of the PF firm (De Bettignies, Ross, 
2008), starting from the public counterpart, in a 
PPP framework, and from the lending institutions. 
This triangular relationship (Moro Visconti, 2014a) 
maps most of the infrastructural economic and 
legal connections that shape the overall PF picture. 
What lies behind the public entity, albeit not being 
formally involved in the investment, is an essential 
prerequisite, being concerned with public policy 
issues (availability of State funds; social targets; 
overall infrastructural planning, etc.). 
Rationale for infrastructural investments is to 
be realistically matched with growing public budget 
constraints, especially in Western countries where 
unprecedented levels of public debt prevent the 
public sponsoring - and so the bankability - of 
many projects. PPP investments have a well-known 
proactive impact on economic growth. Without 
them growth is hampered, and tax incomes are 
dwarfed, so making disinflation of the public debt 
bubble more difficult.  
The nature of the investment company and its 
governance issues, concerning the relationships 
among its stakeholders, strongly depends on its 
informative contents. Hence the importance of big-
data driven information, increasingly available in 
massive terms and in real time. 
 
2.1. The Corporate Governance Puzzle: an 
Adaptation to Public Private Partnerships and 
Project Financing 
 
According to Shleifer, Vishny (1997) “corporate 
governance deals the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment. How do the 
suppliers of finance get managers to return some 
of the profits to them? How do they make sure that 
managers do not steal the capital they supply or 
invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of 
finance control managers? At first glance, it is not 
entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get 
anything back. After all, they part with their money, 
and have little to contribute to the enterprise 
afterward. The professional managers or 
entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well 
abscond with the money. Although they sometimes 
do, usually they do not. (…). In fact, the subject of 
corporate governance is of enormous practical 
importance”. And again, “people who sink the 
capital need to be assured that they get back the 
return on this capital. The corporate governance 
mechanisms provide this assurance”. 
The practical adaptation of these standard 
concepts to the peculiar PF firm (SPV) confirms the 
general framework – suppliers of finance, i.e. equity 
holders and debtholders still look for repayment – 
but should also consider the specific PF scenario.  
The very first concern, a core point within 
standard companies, deals with managerial 
discretion (investment in bad projects, improper 
retention or diversion of cash, etc.). It is a well-
known agency problem (being the manager the 
agent of the principal’s money deriving from equity 
holders and debtholders). Even if also PF 
investments can turn out to be bad or wrong, their 
perimeter and profile is carefully designed and 
known by financiers since its inception. Little room 
is so left for excessive discretionary management, 
squandering on pet projects. It will be shown that 
information asymmetries are also milder, because 
the asset structure is typically represented by fixed 
assets and working capital, with limited if any 
intangibles.   
Absconding with the money – take the money 
and run – seems difficult not only due to limited 
information asymmetries, but also because in many 
cases money from the public buyer to the PF SPV is 
directly managed by the banks of the latter, with no 
possibilities of improper spill over. 
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2.2. Agency Problems and the Utopia of Complete 
Contracts 
 
A core issue of corporate governance is concerned 
with the agency problem, sometimes referred to as 
separation of ownership from control, within firms 
that can be interpreted as a Coasian nexus of 
contracts among different resource holders. 
Agency relationships arise whenever an 
individual, called principal, delegates other 
individuals, called agents, to perform some service; 
the two main relationships are between:  
• The principal-stockholders and the agents-
managers, which are delegated to invest 
shareholders’ capital; 
• The principal-debtholders and the agents-
stockholders, where the former provide funds to 
the firm, underwriting debt, and these funds are 
managed by stockholders and their ultimate agents, 
represented by managers, following the 
relationship described above. 
Since these relationships are not necessarily 
harmonious, conflicts of interests may easily arise 
and so agency theory is primarily concerned with 
the binding mechanisms and incentives that 
principals may use with agents to get their money 
back, possibly with a fair and risk-adjusted gain. 
According to agency theory, in imperfect labour 
and capital markets, managers will inevitably seek 
to maximize their own utility at the expense of 
shareholders. Agents-managers operate in their 
own conflicting self-interest rather than in the best 
interests of the firm. This happens because of 
asymmetric inside information (since they know 
better than shareholders whether they can meet the 
shareholders' objectives) and physiological 
uncertainty (since myriad factors contribute to final 
outcomes, it may so not be evident whether the 
agent directly caused a given outcome, positive or 
negative). 
In PF, agency problems (Farrell, 2003) follow 
the general principles but need again to be flexibly 
adapted to its peculiar context (for a comparison, 
see Table 1). Infrastructural investments are highly 
capital intensive and managers typically have little 
if any personal money to finance them, and so they 
extensively rely on external funding. Due to the 
high leverage typical of the PF industry, most of the 
money, at least during the construction period, 
comes from debtholders, mainly represented by 
banks which underwrite senior debt. Even 
uncertainty, albeit being immanently present in 
everyday life, is in PF somewhat mitigated by a 
bounded investment pattern, with limited 
flexibility. Managerial discretion, a classic 
governance issue, is less likely in PF investments. 
The legal protection system of creditors in PF 
is represented by a complex nexus of loan 
contracts, together with monitoring powers and 
duties from the debtholders’ side. Loan contracts 
are the legal backbone behind financial and 
economic bankability and their binding nature 
intrinsically minimizes managerial discretion. In PF, 
contracts, albeit not being perfectly complete, are 
very detailed. 
The utopia of complete contracts, ideally able 
to cover with their legal provisions all the possible 
states of the world, should realistically face an 
imperfect context, where unforeseen and risky 
events are always possible and likely to occur. To 
minimize problems and fallacies within necessarily 
incomplete contracts, two different approaches 
may be used and confronted, each with its 
advantages and pitfalls: 
1) Detailed contractual provisions, trying to 
regulate with analytical clauses any possible 
situation and state of the world, targeting 
“complete” contracting goals; 
2) Extensive referral to existing laws and 
codes, following and relying on general principles, 
as far as possible. 
Growing experience deriving from PF wider 
application makes detailed contractual provision 
easier to conceive, with sound examples deriving 
from practical cases and, especially, from litigation. 
On the other side, even the legislative framework is 
getting more and more detailed, with legal 
provisions that are easier and more accurate. 
While the analytical approach, albeit being 
“philosophically” sound, aiming at perfect 
contracting, may seem theoretically preferable, its 
pitfalls should not be underestimated. Excessive 
details may lack a general provision of unforeseen 
events, whereas a more general framework of 
reference, albeit seeming less binding, may be more 
elastically applicable to unpredictable states of the 
world. 
Litigation particularly arises in two different 
delicate stages:  
1. When the tender is in progress or to be 
adjudicated, since excluded competitors often sue 
either the public part (within a PPP context) or the 
winning firm; 
2.  During the life of the investment, 
because of underperformance of the winning firm 
or due to claims of the firm against the public 
buyer, often following an opportunistic “bargaining 
after winning” well known malpractice. 
In the PPP’s triangular governance relationship 
between the public buyer, the private entity and its 
backing banks, the role of the latter is not to be 
underestimated. Loan contracts and binding 
financing provisions are typically targeted at 
securing repayment, within a cash-flow based 
guarantee system, where punctual monitoring 
minimizes information asymmetries and liquidity 
channelling – from the public to the private entity, 
through the bank’s intermediation and supervision 
– are the legal and practical cornerstone of proper 
debt servicing.  
Agency problems may undermine reputation 
of agents acting on their own self-interest and, 
from the other side, reputation-building, so useful 
for managers seeking employment, but also for 
shareholders attempting to collect debt, is a 
common explanation for why people respect their 
commitments even if they cannot (always) be 
forced to do so. In PF, the amount of needed “trust” 
is proportional to the needed debt - and so is 
typically not negligible. 
Within the capital structure theoretical 
models, there is a seminal paper of Myers, Majluf 
(1984) regarding information asymmetries and 
raised capital. Since managers have superior inside 
information, these asymmetries increase the cost of 
collecting external capital. This cost may be 
minimized raising at first funds that are weakly 
sensitive to asymmetric information, i.e. for 
example secured debt; equity may be collected only 
at a premium that properly discounts these 
asymmetries. Managers have a self-interest to 
voluntarily minimize information asymmetries, 
with self-imposed monitoring and transparency, to 
ease the equity placement, so decreasing its cost. 
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In the PF industry, the model needs once again 
a proper adaptation and information asymmetries 
are intrinsically reduced by the circumstance that 
managers and shareholders share the project since 
its gestation; proper information also should be 
shared since inception with sponsoring banks. And 
the “disciplined” perimeter of the investment, with 
few possible variants, makes managerial discretion 
a harder option to exercise.  
In PF, proper financial packaging becomes 
essential with detailed and complex contracting. PF 
mitigates transaction costs arising from specific 
investments, the threat of opportunistic behaviour 
and incomplete contracts (Sawant, 2008). Optimal 
capital structure issues in PF have been initially 
addressed by Shah and Thakor (1987). 
Agency problems are strictly linked to 
information asymmetries that fuel conflicts of 
interests and unperceived divergent behaviours. 
Since big data soften asymmetries, they also reduce 
agency concerns. 
 
2.3. Control Rights of Large Shareholders and 
Large Creditors 
 
Since contracts are ontologically incomplete, legal 
protection may be insufficient for shareholders, in 
their potential conflicts with managers, and 
especially for debtholders, conflicting with 
shareholders. Conflicts may arise also between 
managers and debtholders, for example if the 
former illegally extract money for personal abuses, 
threatening proper debt service and breaching their 
duty of loyalty, even though they are typically 
intermediated by shareholders, who appoint the 
managers. Bank loans are typically contracted by 
the managers with the lending institutions but even 
here there might be a role for shareholders, who 
may smooth the relationship with their 
reputational standing or with personal guarantees. 
In infrastructural projects, especially if 
dimensions are big, investors – both shareholders 
and debtholders - are likely to be large. 
Shareholders tend to be big for two main reasons: 
their financial strength, necessary to underwrite 
huge capital and to sponsor big debt collection, and 
their specialization, important for complex 
investments where economies of scale and 
experience are mostly wanted. When the 
investment is ripe, typically after construction and 
at least some years of management, it may be 
suitably placed in the secondary market. Big 
shareholders may so split into many small stock 
exchange investors or they may sell to investment 
funds specialized in infrastructures. 
Also, debtholders, mainly represented by 
banks, tend to be big, since large investments are 
unsuitable for small lending institutions such as 
saving & loan banks or credit cooperatives; when 
the amount of debt to be issued is high, syndicated 
loans among different banks become likelier, 
especially if risk diversification is needed. Even 
bigger banks tend to be more specialized in big 
projects, again with their own economies of scale 
and experience. Being infrastructural PF a 
particularly challenging investment, sophistication 
matters. 
Risk sharing among PPP stakeholders 
(Zulhabri et al., 2006) is another key issue for Value 
for Money considerations, bankability and other 
governance concerns. PESTLE and SWOT analysis, 
fuelled by big data, may represent in this field a 
strategic option for a better preliminary analysis of 
the investment risk patterns (Moro Visconti, 2016). 
Large investors protected by necessarily 
incomplete contracts, should preserve their 
interests, financially represented by the 
underwriting of risky or lent capital, with control 
rights that limit managerial discretion and, from 
the perspective of debtholders, shareholders’ 
conflicting behaviours.  
Large investors are big enough to have 
sufficient incentives for proper and active 
monitoring (even using big data’s timely 
information) and enough control rights to have 
their interests respected. When debt covenants are 
violated or the firm defaults, control rights become 
even tighter, as Smith and Warner (1979) illustrate. 
Short term lending is a well know strategy to 
discipline borrowers, which should show that they 
deserve periodical refunding; in infrastructural PF, 
short term borrowing however does not match long 
term investments and suits working capital 
discounting of accounts receivable, mostly 
concentrated in the management phase, when 
leverage should be already decreasing, after its 
peak typically concentrated at the end of the 
construction phase. 
Large creditors, such as big banks, are also 
potentially active investors, especially when debt 
repayment is at risk and covenants are broken, with 
control rights that they may reluctantly exercise. 
Interference in management is however an ultimate 
option, since banks are typically reluctant to go 
beyond their core business and may risk being 
called for responsibility in case of default.  
Substantial cash flow rights are a powerful 
control device for banks, enabled to intermediate 
funds from the public buyer. These rights allow 
banks, to first repay themselves, following an 
absolute priority rule, and to secure funds from 
improper investments, beyond the agreed 
perimeter.  
Managerial duty of loyalty regards all 
stakeholders, but shareholders may command a 
priority, to the extent that their commitment is 
typically represented by a riskier sunk initial 
investment. Other stakeholders such as employees 
or short-term creditors have a more effective inside 
power, limiting their exposure to short term 
monitored engagements and periodically 
threatening misbehaving managers. 
Both large shareholders and big creditors have 
an incentive (due to the significance of their stake) 
in investing in big data analysis, participating to 
digital platforms and databases where information 
is fuelled and shared. 
 
2.4. The Paradox of Leverage: Is Risk Mitigated by 
Milder Governance Problems? 
 
If you were a bank, would you finance a project 
with 80-20 debt / equity ratio, knowing that the 
assets - mainly consisting of capitalized 
construction costs - are not suitable collateral and 
that a ring fence mechanism protects the private 
entity's shareholders? 
Addressed this way, the question is tricky and 
would unavoidably bring to a negative answer. The 
green light to bankability should consider the 
abovementioned paradox, considering also other 
issues: relatively stable and growing cash inflows 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 14, Issue 4, Summer 2017, Continued - 1 
 
210 
are the key parameter to modify an otherwise 
negative judgment. And since operating cash flows 
mainly consist of positive economic margins, 
reliance on a positive and sustainable operating 
leverage is the true key of bankability (Moro 
Visconti, 2013b). 
As the operation is typically highly leveraged, 
repayment constraints represent a strong incentive 
for the SPV to meet the performance level 
contractually required. 
Even small but relatively stable marginal 
surpluses between the return and the cost of 
capital can bring to positive capital returns, 
especially if amplified by leverage, intrinsically 
risky but well known as a possible wealth 
multiplier.  
According to Subramanian, Tung, Wang 
(2009), PF makes cash flows verifiable, enhancing 
debt capacity, through:  
• Contractual arrangements, made possible by 
structuring the project company as a single, 
discrete project, legally separated from the 
sponsor;  
• Private enforcement of contracts through a 
network of project accounts that ensures lender 
control of the PF cash flows. 
In PF, extensive contracts combined with 
private enforcement mechanisms limit borrower 
discretion on cash flows. To the extent that cash 
flows are verifiable, agency costs of debt are 
reduced and debt capacity is enhanced. A network 
of non-financial contracts is set up to limit the 
managerial discretion of project sponsors, to make 
cash flows better verifiable for lenders, and to 
reduce the negative impact of unexpected events 
on project cash flows (Corielli et al., 2010). 
Risk distribution is, once again, 
asymmetrically distributed and affects the Free 
Cash Flow to equity, regarding dividends: when 
debt is reimbursed, there is obviously much more 
room to remunerate capital but the very fact that 
this happens later and in a residual way makes 
equity injections intrinsically riskier and cost of 
equity consequently more expensive (Moro 
Visconti, 2013a). 
The very fact that cash flows are more 
verifiable in PF than in corporate debt financing 
makes Free Cash Flow abuses less harmful for 
debtholders. 
If the interest rate tax shield is a typical 
argument in favour of the leverage, conversely risk 
of default of the private entity is a topic against 
excessive debt; this standard trade-off should be 
adapted to the peculiar characteristics of the SPV. 
Its default, theoretically always possible, would 
have disastrous consequences for the public part, 
to the extent that it would bring to an interruption 
of strategic services (e.g. clean up; maintenance …). 
Aware of this, contractual provisions regulate the 
case to avoid any interruption of core services; this 
intrinsically makes the risk of default less dramatic 
for the public counterpart but not automatically so 
for the creditors of the private entity. Some may 
wonder if, just in case, they can replace the equity 
holders in managing the private entity and the 
answer, provided that the public part accepts and 
that the service is not worsened, may well be 
positive. In such a case, the private entity would 
have a residual value (the discounted value of 
future contracts), limiting its default risk, that 
seems however reasonably unlikely - if compared 
with other businesses. 
(High) leverage is sustainable also if debt 
service cover ratio is sufficiently robust, ranging 
well above unity - but this is the case in the final 
years of management, where operating cash flows 
tend to be stable but residual debt, thanks to 
reimbursements, is consistently lower. 
The standard agency problems of debt 
concern the conflict of interests between a 
potential lender (the principal), who has the money 
but is not the entrepreneur, and a potential 
borrower (the agent), a manager with business 
ideas who lacks the money to finance them. The 
principal can become a shareholder, so sharing risk 
and rewards with the agent, or a lender, entitled to 
receive a fixed claim. Agency theory explains the 
mismatch of resources and abilities that can affect 
both the principal and the agent: since they need 
each other, incentives for reaching a compromise 
are typically strong. As leverage grows, risk is 
increasingly transferred from equity to debt 
holders. 
 
Figure 1. Agency costs of equity and debt when leverage changes 
 
 
Note: Big data help monitoring debt exposure and repayment capacity, fuelling bankability indicators.
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2.5. Information asymmetries, adverse selection, 
and moral hazard 
 
Typical corporate governance problems between 
lenders and borrowers, represented by banks and 
the private SPV, are somewhat milder than the ones 
present in other private companies and standard 
corporate investment. It is well known that 
information asymmetries traditionally arise since 
borrowers have better information about their 
creditworthiness and risk taking that has the 
lending bank. They originate conflicts of interest 
which might seriously prevent efficient allocation 
of finance: the liquidity allocation problem derives 
from the fact that although money is abundant, it is 
nevertheless not easy to give it to the right 
borrowers. In the case of PF, the investment should 
be carefully designed and analytically described, so 
reducing the information gap between borrowers 
and lenders. 
Corporate governance issues are different 
with complementary shareholders and triangular 
stakeholders (public and private entities; banks) 
that represent the typical PPP framework. 
Relationship lending, relies on personal 
interaction between borrowers and lenders and is 
based on an understanding of the borrower’s 
business, more than to standard guarantees or 
credit scoring mechanisms. It can take place when 
the sponsoring banks are part of the private 
entity's shareholders or - to a lesser extent - if they 
already have strong ties with the main private 
entity's shareholders, whose credit trustworthiness 
is positively acknowledged. 
Adverse selection is another typical problem 
in money lending. It occurs when banks - not 
knowing who is who - cannot easily discriminate 
between good and risky borrowers, who should 
deserve higher interest rate charges. 
Moral hazard is a classical “take the money 
and run problem”, since borrowers might try to 
abscond with the bank’s money or try not to fully 
engage them in the project for which they have 
been financed. 
To the extent that there is symmetric 
information between debt and equity holders, PF 
simultaneously alleviates the classical inefficient 
managerial problems of under - and over - 
investment. 
Another positive characteristic of PF is the 
presence of relatively few information asymmetries 
in the assets of the SPV. According to the Leland 
and Pyle’s (1977) seminal paper, borrowers 
typically know the value of their assets, to be used 
as collateral, much better then lenders, so rising 
moral hazard conflicts that prevent optimal 
resource allocation; this produces an incentive to 
minimize information asymmetries.  
Liquidity does not bear any information 
asymmetry, but also capitalized construction costs 
are easily observable by outside providers of 
finance, who can monitor work in progress during 
the construction and get evidence of the effective 
costs of the private entity.  
Incentives for borrowers to exaggerate 
positive qualities of their projects, with costly or 
impossible verification of true characteristics by 
outside parties, considered in the Leland and Pyle 
model, are uncommon in PF.  
Strategic bankruptcy is false information that 
the borrower gives about the outcome of his 
financed investment, stating that it has failed even 
if it’s not true only in order not to give back the 
borrowed money.  
These classical corporate governance 
problems are well known in traditional banking - as 
it will be seen in Table 1. They naturally bring to 
sub-optimal allocation of financial resources and to 
capital rationing problems that frequently affect 
even potentially sound borrowers, if they are not 
able to differentiate themselves from those who 
bluff.  The signalling effect of debt, according to 
which only firms with sound borrowing capacity 
can send a costly message – issue debt – to 
differentiate them from others, analysed by Ross 
(1977), is unlikely in the PF context, since the debt 
pattern should already be known since the 
beginning. The theory of signalling states that 
information asymmetry between a firm and 
outsiders leads the former to make certain changes 
in its capital structure. Ross (1977) and Myers & 
Majluf (1984) have shown that under asymmetric 
information, firms may prefer debt to equity 
financing. 
Within the PF context, these problems can 
somewhat be mitigated, so reducing agency costs 
of debt, not only taking profit of lower information 
asymmetries, but also using simple but effective 
devices, such as cash flow channelling (with 
physical control over bank accounts). Since the 
private entity's cash flows mostly (apart from 
smaller "hot" revenues) come from one big source, 
the public part, the bank can compensate cash 
inflows with expiring debts, so avoiding any 
potential cash diversion.  
PF enhances the verifiability of cash flows 
through contractual constraints, including a 
network of project accounts that are under the 
lender's control and into which project cash flows 
are required to be deposited (Subramanian et al., 
2009).  
Moral hazard temptations are relatively 
unlikely, since it is difficult either to divert the 
bank's money from its strategic aim - financing the 
building - or to avoid getting fully engaged in the 
project, due to the pressure for quality and 
achievements coming from the public part - 
building and running a public hospital is not a joke. 
Legal clauses, protecting the bank, may 
consider cash flow verifiability and segregation, 
using waterfall provisions. 
A comparison between standard corporate 
debt investments and corporate finance, useful also 
to assess Value for Money (Burger, Hawkesworth, 
2011; Moro Visconti, 2014b), bankability issues and 
profitability, is synthesized in Table 1. 
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Table 1. To lend or not to lend? Comparison between corporate debt and project financing 
 
Parameter / 
situation 
Corporate debt finance Project Finance 
Guarantees 
Asset based projects bear physical guarantees and, to the extent that they are not sufficient, personal 
covenants from the shareholders. 
The guarantee is given by the cash flows of the project. Limited or no recourse models make private entity's 
shareholders mildly or not responsible. 
Leverage 
The (optimal) amount of leverage is a consequence of the guarantees and many other parameters (bankability; 
conflicts of interests and information asymmetries ...). 
Typically higher than in standard corporate investments, with a profile more similar to LBOs. Lower risks, 
described in many parameters in this table, make this possible, to an extent that should be decided and 
monitored case by case. 
Adverse 
selection 
Adverse selection is a typical problem in money lending, since banks - not knowing who is who - cannot easily 
discriminate between good and risky borrowers, who should deserve higher interest rate charges. 
The track record and reputation of borrowers is less easily identifiable in PF, since the private entity typically 
has several shareholders, but - to the extent that the borrower is the new private entity and that the 
investment project is highly detailed, adverse selection problems are not so important in PF. 
Moral 
hazard 
Moral hazard is a classical “take the money and run problem”, since borrowers might try to abscond with the 
bank’s money or try not to fully engage them in the project for which they have been financed. 
Cash flow channelling through the lending bank makes money hiding extremely difficult. 
Information 
asymmetries 
In economics and contract theory, an information asymmetry is present when one party to a transaction has 
more or better information than the other party. 
Moral hazard, adverse selection, assets substitution are much less harmful in PF and cash flows pass through 
the lending institutions and are easier to forecast and monitor, leading to a consistent reduction in 
information asymmetries, considering also that there is just one well known (albeit complex) investment to 
monitor. 
Strategic 
bankruptcy 
Strategic bankruptcy is false information that the borrower gives about the outcome of his financed 
investment, stating that it has failed even if it’s not true only in order not to give back the borrowed money. 
The lender's right to liquidate is central to forcing the borrower to repay its debt. 
Less probable with verifiable cash flows. 
Probability 
of 
default 
Should the financed corporation go bankrupt, residual value becomes important and companies with a high 
level of intangibles, mainly valuable in a going concern context, are typically penalized while asking for 
money. 
Debt holders may threat to file for bankruptcy, to force repayments. This threat is effective to the extent that 
there is an expected value from asset liquidation. 
A project company private entity is separated and bankruptcy remote from the investing firm sponsors that 
create it. The project company relies extensively on debt capital provided by creditors to fund project 
operations. Creditors provide more (less) debt as a percentage of overall project capital when there is less 
(more) risk of project failure and non-repayment. 
Asset 
substitution 
A company's exchange of lower-risk investments for higher-risk investments. Firms may use asset 
substitution as a form of financing, or as a move to please shareholders. It can be detrimental to the 
company's bondholders as it increases the possibility of default without any corresponding benefit because 
bonds have a fixed interest rate. On the other hand, asset substitution can benefit shareholders as it carries 
the possibility of higher returns. 
This risk makes debt more difficult and expensive. 
This risk is very unlikely in PF, where investments are contractually fixed and observable by financing 
institutions. 
Level of legal 
protection 
of debtholders 
Asset based, often with guarantees. Cash flow based, with little if any guarantee (limited or no recourse). 
Cash flow 
volatility 
The volatility of the business model and the fact that the demand risk is entirely borne by the company, 
typically makes cash flows highly volatile and hardly predictable - bad news for lenders. 
Even in PF cash flows are volatile, but normally consistently less than in other businesses, especially if cold 
revenues and cash flows are predominant, leaving core demand risk to the public part. 
Cash flow 
segregation 
Difficult with multiple projects; would be a (potentially harmful) impediment to managerial discretion. The 
lender's right to claim money back central to force the borrower to repay, limiting strategic default 
temptations. 
Contractually envisaged in the agreements between the private entity and its lenders, it allows avoiding most 
conflicts between equity and debt holders.  
Cash flow 
verifiability 
Strictly dependent on the business and market model, normally consistently harder than that of PF. 
When cash flows are more verifiable, the entire distribution of cash flows available to all fixed and residual 
claimants shifts to the right. 
Upside 
potential 
Reward and excess return of the investment, typically belonging only to the shareholders. Should the risk / 
return profile be unbalanced, peculiar sources of funds, more suitable to follow the assets' profile, may be 
issued (convertible bonds or other hybrid securities …). 
Upside potential is limited, due to the limited presence of hot revenues and to contractual caps (market 
testing …) on other revenues. As a consequent, there is little if any need to issue hybrid securities. 
Evaluation 
Cash flow evaluations are difficult, to the extent that this parameter is hardly predictable. Market 
comparisons are possible and make sense if there is a sufficiently wide and similar database of other 
transactions. 
The evaluation (assets side ≈ NPV
project 
or equity side ≈ NPV
equity
) should consider the following peculiarities: 
 no terminal value, since the private entity is typically dissolved once the concession has expired, its 
terminal value is zero; 
 less volatile (more predictable); 
 precise (contractual) duration of useful life; 
 market comparisons are hindered by the project's uniqueness. 
Change in the 
business model 
(mission drift) 
Possible and even frequent, especially from a substantial point of view, trying to adapt the business to a 
wildly changing market. Unperceived changes increase information asymmetries and assets substitution 
chances. 
There is no risk of a change in the business model, due to little competitive threats and binding contractual 
agreements. 
Time extension 
of the 
investment 
Normally consistently shorter than in PF, often uneasy to be contractually bound, often overlapping with 
other investments having different amounts and maturities. Consequently, even short-term financing has a 
roll over implicit option. 
Long term investment, typically exceeding 20 years, is an intrinsic risk. 
Residual 
value 
Infrastructural investments typically have a residual value, representing a worthy guarantee if debt is by then 
still outstanding.  
Little it any residual value if the project is abandoned - a rare case with public hospitals. In any case, with a 
free transfer of the infrastructure to the public part, the residual value of the private entity is typically zero. 
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3. BEYOND INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES: BIG 
DATA-DRIVEN VALUE CHAINS AND PPP VALUE 
CO-CREATION 
 
Information asymmetries are relevant even in PPP 
and in PF investment schemes, for the reasons 
indicated in Table 1. 
Big data sharing through digital value chains 
(described in Moro Visconti et al., 2017a) can soften 
these asymmetries with a constant interaction 
among composite PPP stakeholders. Digital chains 
connect stakeholders and represent a practical 
extension of the network theory. The theory is fully 
consistent with a PPP governance paradigm, where 
public and private stakeholders are nodes 
connected through interacting transactions and 
data sharing. 
Value chains, even in traditional terms 
irrespective of either big data or networks, are the 
strategic backbone of business modeling and 
planning, indicating what the target corporate goals 
are. 
A big data-driven value chain is represented 
by several consequential steps such as data 
creation, search and capture, storage, querying, 
analysis, sharing and transfer, visualization, 
customization. Each step, codified by software 
algorithms, is part of an incremental and flexible 
value chain. Every step adds up value that should 
be shared among its contributors (providers, 
intermediating platforms, users, etc.), which 
participate to value co-creation. This chain 
produces different stages of information that are 
embedded in traditional value chains that so 
become big data-driven.  
Big data value chain is based on the following 
strategic steps: 
1. Creation (data capture); 
2. Storage (warehousing); 
3. Processing (data mining - fusion and 
analytics); 
4. Consumption (sharing); 
5. Monetization. 
Monetization is crucial for the verification of 
proper debt service. In collaborative networks, 
multiple, diverse stakeholders are working together 
to co-create innovative value (Reypens et al., 2016). 
Value chains are linked to supply chains (Moro 
Visconti et al., 2017b): while the former represent 
the steps that connect different stakeholders, the 
latter describe the operational flow of PF activities. 
Big data make supply chains more resilient 
(Papadopoulos et al., 2016), as they instantaneously 
absorb and reflect information. Risk (i.e., the 
difference between expected versus real outcomes) 
can consequently be softened, with shared 
governance benefits (lower cost of capital; higher 
bankability; milder conflicts of interest, etc.). 
Both value chains and supply chains can be 
connected with digital platforms and interoperable 
databases where big data-sourced information is 
shared among PPP stakeholders. 
Networking platforms that host data and 
connect stakeholders so represent a key 
component of these value-adding supply chains. 
Value chains are fuelled by the so-called “big data’s 
V-dimensions”.  Table 2 shows the main impacts of 
big data on PPP / PF and corporate governance 
issues. 
 
Table 2. Impact of big data characteristics on PPP, project finance and corporate governance issues 
 
Big data dimensions Impact on PPP, project finance and corporate governance issues 
Volume 
Big volumes of data dramatically increase the width, scale, and quality of available information. 
Budgeting and reporting become more precise. Differences between forecast and actual data 
decrease, reducing risk (inversely proportional to Value for Money) and making the PF supply chain 
more resilient. Relationships among the PPP stakeholders are likely to improve.  
Velocity 
Data are accumulated in real-time and at a rapid pace. The velocity of proliferating data increases 
when the system (represented for instance by interoperable databases) improves, due to machine 
learning and artificial intelligence. Velocity, like volume, minimizes the gap between forecast and 
actual data. 
Variety 
Evidence-based samples combine and analyse a variety of structured, semi-structured, and 
unstructured data, to match forecasts with outcomes, predict risk patterns, and provide more 
efficient analyses. Variety increases the comprehension of the stakeholders needs. 
Veracity 
Key parameter in PPP investments, corresponding to data reliability. Increased variety and high 
velocity hinder the ability to cleanse data before analysing it and making decisions, magnifying the 
issue of data “trust”. Veracity can contribute to minimize opportunistic behaviours and conflicts of 
interest. 
Validity 
Data integrity is defined as the validity, accuracy, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the data. 
It is linked to veracity. 
Variability 
Variability of data increases their information value, and should be linked with other parameters as 
velocity or variety. When variability is considered and promptly incorporated in updated business 
models, risk is reduced.  
Virality 
Measures the spread rate of data (sharing speed) across the network. It increases the involvement of 
different stakeholders, even outside the perimeter of the PPP investment.  
Visualization 
Information visualization and visual analytics are connected to IT systems through representation 
technologies that help users to understand data. The synthesis produced by data visualization tools 
is a key element to transform the information revealed by big data processing, understood only by 
specialists, into accessible knowledge.  
Viscosity 
Characterizes the resistance to navigate in the dataset or complexity of data processing. It is a 
common feature of data in many PPP sectors (as healthcare). 
Value 
Monetized value (Walker, 2015) is the synthesis of big data V-dimensions, considering data as an 
asset to exploit to produce innovation and new information-sensitive products and services.  In PF 
applications, the Value for Money is spread among PPP stakeholders, improving the bankability of 
the overall project.  
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Big data shared through digital chains 
influence predictive analytics and business 
planning (Franks, 2014; Muhtaroglu et al., 2013), a 
core element of PF long-termed investment 
patterns that strongly influences the dynamics of 
corporate governance issues among PPP 
stakeholders.  
Big data descriptive, prescriptive and 
predictive modelling attitudes can be incorporated 
in business planning, creating value through 
appropriate implementation strategies that 
leverage information value. 
To the extent that PPP stakeholders, linked 
through digital networks, exchange information 
and blend their ideas, they build value co-creation 
strategies, jointly producing mutually valued 
outcomes. Fitter and better PF investments are the 
ideal result, with positive externalities that 
minimize conflicts of interest, cost of collected 
capital, and other governance concerns. 
 
4. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study has shown from a theoretical side how 
PPP initiatives, incorporated in SPVs or other 
investment vehicles, differ from standard 
corporations. Corporate governance issues are also 
different, as they are concerned with a peculiar 
firm, within a PPP network where public and private 
stakeholders interact with their sponsoring banks. 
The presence of the public actor introduces a new 
element that goes beyond the traditional 
contraposition between managers, shareholders 
and debtholders. 
The standard theoretical framework of 
corporate governance has been adapted to a 
peculiar case where the PPP investment company is 
represented by a Coasian network of contracts that 
goes far beyond its legal perimeter. The SPV is in 
fact represented by a convergence of PPP interests 
bundled and coordinated in a joint venture 
business. This brings to an innovative approach to 
standard governance concerns, as complete 
contracts, uneasy to be conceived in normal 
situations, are even more difficult in presence of 
long-termed and sophisticated PF investments. 
Another classic concern that needs to be 
adapted to the peculiar case is represented by the 
control right of large shareholders and creditors 
that are endemic in capital intensive PPP projects. It 
is shown that cash-flow based financing, typical of 
any PF scheme, differs from traditional asset based 
financing. Guarantees are also different and they 
involve a divergent composition of conflicts of 
interest and risk management. 
Table 1 investigates about the core differences 
between standard corporate debt financing versus 
PF (in a PPP context). These differences describe 
what happens when the main corporate governance 
issues, concerning these two models, materialize. 
This basic comparison is then extended to a new 
interpretation of the classic governance concerns, 
investigating what happens to information 
asymmetries when big data and digital platforms 
are considered.  
The paper has also described the key features 
of PPP contracts, considering what happens when 
PPP investments are backed by a cash-flow based 
PF package. 
Information asymmetries (that represent a 
classic governance concern) have been examined, 
showing the peculiarities of PPP / PF investments. 
Even if PF investments are long-termed, they follow 
a defined business plan schedule that may reduce 
asymmetries. The paradox of leverage emerges as 
one of the results of the study: even if PF 
investments are typically highly leveraged, risk can 
be somewhat minimized with constant scrutiny of 
the project evolution and cash flow segregation for 
debt service. 
A further step is represented by the 
introduction of big data and digital networks, 
showing that big data improve information, so 
reducing asymmetries, and that networks are 
consistent with a PPP framework of interacting 
stakeholders. 
New research avenues should examine a 
classic problem, crucial for the sustainability of 
long-termed investments: what happens to 
business planning when it incorporates big data 
and information sharing through networked 
platforms?  
Even if the literature (Walker, 2015; Moro 
Visconti et al., 2017a) shows that big data improve 
the description, prescription and especially the 
prediction of events, this general statement is still 
under investigated, considering its adaptation to 
circumstances, as the PPP / PF framework. Business 
plans are nurtured by information and challenged 
by their asymmetries, up to the point of generating 
corporate governance dysfunctions, as 
underinvestment, overinvestment, opportunistic 
behaviours, or to a complete failure of the project 
that may become fully unbankable for lack of trust. 
The link between value and supply chain that 
shows how stakeholders interact with operations 
also needs further scrutiny, remembering that 
better coordination produces shared productivity 
gains. 
A new frontier, still underinvestigated, is 
represented by results-based financing strategies 
(Shroff et al., 2017) that remunerate private 
stakeholders with public savings. They occur in a 
capital rationing context where public budget is 
limited, wondering if community can realistically 
afford the investments that it increasingly needs. 
Even in this case, prompt information about 
savings is crucial for proper resource allocation 
and consequent bankability of PPP/PF investments. 
Smart cities with integrated PPP investments are 
the ultimate example of emerging trends, still 
looking for academic scrutiny. 
Further research should also consider new 
technological patterns, such as those represented 
by fintech applications. Information technology 
breakthroughs such as big data-based financial 
technologies (Fintech) have been identified as 
important disruptive driving forces for this 
paradigm shift (Yan et al., 2015). 
Artificial intelligence and interoperable 
databases represent a further example of new 
technological frontiers that are going to impact the 
delicate relationships among composite 
stakeholders. Even these aspects should be 
examined, considering their corporate governance 
implications, either in a PPP/PF framework or in 
classic ownership and control scenario. 
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